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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 Practically all the analyses of the potential conflicts between the People’s Republic of
China and Taiwan are structured along the same lines: an analysis of the balance of
military power and a review of the scenarios for the outbreak of hostilities. They are
generally completed with an examination of the possible progress of operations and
above  all  by  an  examination  of  the  consequences  and  implications  internationally.
Sometimes the consequences of the economic interdependence of the two potential
adversaries are also taken into account.
2 In China and Taiwan: Is war conceivable?, Jean-Pierre Cabestan has sought to go further,
progressing from the problems of military defence to those of global defence. A China
watcher for many years, he is one of the few researchers to have carried out detailed
work on the Taiwanese part of the equation. The result is a reference work filled with
often  little-known  or  unpublished  information,  and  which  draws  up  an  almost
exhaustive  inventory  of  the  situation  before  making  some  predictions.  It  also
emphasises that what is often taken to be a bilateral problem is in fact largely governed
by the positions taken on the third corner of the triangle: Washington.
3 In Taiwan, as in the People’s Republic of China, everything concerning military affairs
is highly opaque. National sources are, on the Peking side, almost totally controlled. In
Taipei  the  implacable  conflict  within  a  new democracy  hardly  generates  any  more
light. External sources, essentially American, are few in number and very dependent on
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various lobbies. To this must be added some complex affairs which have given birth to
rumours from which it is often difficult to extricate oneself.  The author has had to
carry out an enormous task of cross-checking in order to avoid a number of pitfalls.
4 The first part of the book deals with the military equation, as seen principally from the
Taiwanese side. While the first chapter is devoted to the rising power of the People’s
Liberation  Army  (PLA),  the  next  four  deal  with  the  military  machine  at  Taipei’s
disposal.  The  analysis  of  the  PLA’s  capacities  goes  beyond  the  figures  usually
presented–impressive as these are–and takes into account both the intentions of the
leadership and the persistent deficiencies. To the leaders of the Chinese Communist
Party, the very existence of Taiwan is unacceptable. This does not prevent them from
recognising their inability to bring about reunification by force, a shift in the balance of
power in their favour being hoped for by 2010. They are therefore going to attempt, in
the most authentic Chinese strategic tradition, to use all other means to succeed. The
study of the Taiwanese terms poses the problem of the place and the role of the armed
forces of a country whose survival is at stake. Having established the basic concepts
and  the  strategies  which  flow  from  them,  the  author  draws  an  extremely
comprehensive picture of the makeup of the island’s defences. The great interest of this
book is that it studies the foundations as well as the present situation and the prospects
for the future. A chapter devoted to equipment and budget problems is followed by a
study of two much less well-known subjects, the organisation of the armed forces (as
well as the links between the army and the nation), and the strategic and structural
vulnerabilities of the Taiwanese armed forces.
5 The second part of the book is devoted to an equally exhaustive and largely innovative
study  of  the  overall  defence  of  Taiwan,  which  is  nothing  less  than  a  struggle  for
survival, in the face of an adversary who could attack at any moment. The ubiquity of
the relationship between Taiwan and the United States is set out in detail, and goes
deeper into the reasons for, and the implications of, the “quasi-alliance” between the
two countries. The following chapters are respectively devoted to the position of the
Republic  of  China  on  the  international  scene,  where  it  is  less  isolated  than  often
appears to be the case, as well as to its advantages and vulnerabilities. On an economic
level, the links between the two Chinas and the dependence of Taipei, but also that of
Peking, on the outside world, complicate matters considerably, in particular because of
the permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese on the mainland. The
island’s political system is in constant evolution, and a national consensus is proving
difficult  to establish.  Lastly,  the psychological peculiarities of Taiwanese society are
given an interesting exposition, in particular on the dangers of Finlandisation or of
“Hongkongization”. The part of the book devoted to the People’s Republic is very short,
but enlightening.
6 The last part is entitled “The Weak against the Weak?”. Jean Pierre Cabestan provides
some solid  justification for  this  apparently  incongruous  question.  The  first  chapter
reviews,  in  a  fairly  classical  manner,  the  various  causes  which  could  lead  to  the
eruption of a conflict, or more accurately to an attack on the island by the PLA. The
highly detailed and realistic analysis of the predictable scenarios—limited operations or
all-out war—is preceded by two short passages which ask the questions: “Will China
seek to legalise its armed act?” and “Will the Taiwanese resist?”. Lastly, the concluding
chapter tackles Peking’s favoured strategies. In the Chinese world, the concepts set out
by  Sun Zi  remain pre-eminent.  It  would  be  inconceivable  for  China  not  to  seek  to
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achieve its ends by means which would avoid a major attack, which would be militarily
risky and ruinous in image terms. Thus a scenario is presented of increasing pressure,
combining  psychological  action  with  strategic  undermining,  which  seeks  to  obtain
capitulation without a struggle, rather than victory.
7 The book is completed by a series of annexes containing much information, some of
which, on the Taiwanese forces, is not widely known. The bibliography is extremely
comprehensive.
8 China  and  Taiwan:  Is  war  conceivable? is  therefore  essential  reading  for  anyone  who
wishes to really deepen their understanding of a problem which weighs heavily on the
triangular relationship between Peking, Taipei and Washington.
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